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Abstract
Efforts to align the global financial system with climate security and sustainable 
development are entering a new phase. Five years ago, only a handful of central 
banks were addressing the significance of the environmental crisis for the delivery of 
their mandate. Today, a growing number of central banks, along with supervisors 
across banking, insurance, pensions and securities, are moving from the recognition 
of their role in building a sustainable financial system to the implementation of a 
growing range of measures. This paper charts the rise of central bank and supervisor 
action on climate change and wider sustainability issues, analyses the key features 
of the “new normal” and then highlights priority themes for policy and research in the 
years ahead.
1  Introduction: The rise of central bank action on climate 
and sustainability 
The full resources and expertise of the global financial system will be needed to 
respond to the existential threat of climate change and wider environmental crises 
such as the decline in biodiversity, the human and ecological impacts of air and 
water pollution, as well as the degradation of natural resources. In 2007, the Stern 
Review concluded that climate change was “the world’s greatest market failure” 
[Stern (2007), p. VIII]. Prices not only fail to reflect the costs of carbon pollution, but 
many climate damaging activities (notably in the energy and agricultural sectors) 
continue to be incentivised with perverse government subsidies, amounting to some 
5.2 per cent of global GDP in 2017 according to Coady et al. (2019). Strategically, this 
implies that most, if not all, financial assets are mispriced to a greater or lesser 
extent, posing major challenges for central banks and supervisors seeking to 
encourage efficient capital allocation, safe and sound financial institutions and 
financial stability of the system as a whole. 
Until recently, the debate, as well as practical strategies to promote sustainability, 
have focused on correcting market and policy failures in the real economy with 
fiscal policy as the first best solution (e.g. through internalising externalities through 
pricing reform), supplemented by the provision of public finance to fill market gaps 
(e.g. in the development and deployment of sustainable technologies). Initially, only 
a limited role was assigned to central banks and financial supervisors, with a focus 
largely on addressing information asymmetries in the marketplace through improved 
disclosure. The essential complementary role of financial regulation came to the 
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fore following the global financial crisis and the growing recognition of the system-
wide scale of the threat posed by the disruption of the natural capital foundations 
for long-term economic development [Robins and Zadek (2016)]. According to the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Inquiry into the Design of a 
Sustainable Financial System, by 2008, only around 50 sustainability measures had 
been adopted by central banks, financial supervisors and other public authorities 
worldwide; by the end of 2013, this had more than doubled to 131, which doubled 
again to 267 by the end of 2017 [McDaniels and Robins (2018)].1 
An early signal for central banks and financial supervisors emerged in September 
2015 through a speech by Bank of England governor Carney (2015) on the “Tragedy 
of the Horizon”, which outlined the novel threat of climate change for financial 
stability, transmitted through physical, transmission and liability risk. The agreement 
of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by the world’s governments in the 
same month laid out a comprehensive approach to integrating economic, social and 
environmental factors. In December 2015, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change 
went further, setting the goal in Article 2.1 c) of “making finance flows consistent with 
a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” 
[UNFCCC (2016), p. 3]. 
From these foundations, central banks and supervisors have increasingly 
recognised sustainability as relevant to their core mandates and functions. Looking 
across 133 investigated institutions, 38 central banks and monetary unions are 
mandated to support their government’s economic priorities, which may include 
the transition to low-carbon growth in the future, and 16 mandates include the 
explicit objective to enhance the “sustainability” [Dikau and Volz (2019a)]. 
Today, it is increasingly recognised that the macroeconomic implications and 
regulatory consequences of unabated climate change for central banks are 
significant, for prudential as well as monetary policies [Cœuré (2018)]. This process 
has been supported by the growth in international cooperation, initially through the 
G20’s Green Finance Study Group, as well as the Task Force on Climate-related 
Financial Disclosures (TCFD) of the Financial Stability Board (FSB). When the 
possibility of consensus-based progress through the G20 became constrained 
following the election of the current US Administration, new coalitions were built, 
notably through the establishment of the Network for Greening the Financial System 
(NGFS) in December 2017 with eight initial members. The NGFS has since grown to 
46 members and 9 observer central banks and supervisors, which represent over 
half of global greenhouse gas emissions [NGFS (2019a), p. 1]. The NGFS can be seen 
1 There is no comparable assessment of the number of sustainable finance measures adopted since 2017. 
In 2019, the Principles for Responsible Investment estimates that there are now 730 measures across the 
world covering environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors, with a focus on the investment sector 
[PRI (2019)].
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as a “coalition of the willing” working to exchange experience and promote shared 
action on the impact of climate change and other environmental factors on their 
objectives and operations. International financial organisations, including the 
International Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlement, have also 
been increasingly active in addressing the challenges posed by climate change (see 
Table 1). 
What is striking is how financial authorities have successfully developed a compelling 
narrative for their involvement, which respects their specific functions and mandates 
(notably around risk and stability), separate from political imperatives. US financial 
authorities such as the Federal Reserve are also beginning to recognise the 
importance of climate risk in spite of opposition in the political sphere [Powell (2019) 
and Rudebusch (2019)]. 
Traditionally, central banks believed that they had no role to play in confronting 
climate change and sustainability. This phase is now over. The next phase of 
acknowledging the challenge and the role that they can play is also coming to an 
end. We are moving into a more action-oriented phase focusing on adjusting 
existing central bank policies and activities. Beyond this lie full integration of 
climate change and sustainable development as key features of central bank and 
regulatory operations and the ultimate goal of the alignment of the financial system 
with the goals of Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals, 
BIS The growing interest in climate-related risks at the BIS has been reinforced recently by Deputy General Manager Pereira da Silva
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RESEARCH AND CAPACITY BUILDING ON CLIMATE CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Table 1
SOURCE: "NLOHKDCAX@TSGNQR
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facilitated, guided and driven by the actions of central banks and supervisors (see 
Figure 1). 
The remainder of this chapter explores the key pillars of the emerging “new normal” 
for central banks and financial supervisors. The final section outlines the central 
challenges that exist, points to new horizons and concludes.
2  The new normal: the acknowledgment and incorporation 
of sustainability factors
It has been increasingly accepted by monetary and supervisory authorities that 
climate and sustainability-related factors are a source of financial risk and fall within 
the financial stability mandates of central banks and supervisors [NGFS (2018)]. The 
bulk of the focus has been on the threat of climate change and there is broad 
agreement on the two main transmission channels, namely physical and transition 
risk. Most of the policies and initiatives of this “new normal” can be clustered around 
five main areas of activity:
— Awareness raising and capacity building.
— Micro-prudential supervision.
— Macro-prudential action and financial stability.
— Monetary policy.
— Scaling up green finance. 
PHASES IN THE ENGAGEMENT OF CENTRAL BANKS AND SUPERVISORS
IN CLIMATE AND SUSTAINABILITY
Figure 1
SOURCE: Compiled by authors.
Phase 1 - Inaction
Phase 2 - Acknowledgement
Phase 3 - Adjustment
Phase 4 - Integration
Phase 5 - Alignment
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2.1 Awareness raising and capacity building
A first important step for central banks and financial supervisors lies in signalling 
the importance of sustainability factors both internally and externally to the wider 
market. Beyond the issuance of binding regulation and supervisory expectations, a 
central role for monetary and supervisory authorities lies in educating financial 
institutions with regard to the implications of climate change for their operations to 
ensure that climate change-related financial risks are understood and are disclosed 
and managed. The formation of in-house capacity and global cooperation with 
other institutions and researchers thereby plays an important role for enhancing 
the conceptualisation of climate-related risks with regard to financial stability 
implications, as well as understanding the needs and options for enhancing green 
finance. A clear evolution in central banks” approaches to market signalling on 
climate and sustainability issues can be identified in the speeches of central bank 
TIMELINE OF MAJOR SPEECHES ON CLIMATE CHANGE BY CENTRAL BANKERS, 2015-2019
Table 2
SOURCE: Compiled by authors.
NOTE: Out of the 4,426 central banker speeches archived by the BIS between 2015 and today (October 2019), 42 speeches address climate change 
or sustainability.
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governors since 2015, which have become progressively more activist and moved 
from the mere acknowledgment of climate change towards calls for mandatory 
rules (see Table 2). 
2.2 Microprudential policy
Climate- and wider sustainability-related risks have direct implications for the goals 
of micro-prudential regulation to ensure the safety and soundness of individual 
financial institutions, cutting across the classic pillars of risk-weighted capital, 
supervisory review and market discipline through disclosure. The First Progress 
Report by the NGFS (2018) has reinforced central banks” acceptance that climate 
change and the transition towards a low-carbon economy are relevant sources of 
financial risk at the micro-prudential level. An important supervisory step lies in the 
calibration of micro-prudential instruments. Banco Central do Brasil (BCB) has been 
among the first central banks to issue regulation that addresses environmental and 
social risk, requiring commercial banks to incorporate environmental risk factors in 
their “Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process” (ICAAP) [Banco Central do 
Brasil (2011)].
Promoting market discipline through enhanced disclosure has been the main focus 
for central banks and supervisors, notably through the FSB’s TCFD. Insurance 
supervisors have been at the forefront of micro-prudential action. For example, the 
California Department of Insurance has addressed transition risks of carbon-
intensive “stranded assets” on the books of insurance companies by requiring firms 
to disclose their investments in fossil fuels and requesting them to divest voluntarily 
from thermal coal investments [Jones (2018)].
Disclosure often requires changes in legal frameworks alongside supervisory 
requirements for institutions to improve their reporting of climate risk 
management and governance. France’s Energy Transition Law, for example, 
under Article 173, requires firms to disclose their climate-related risks or 
provide an adequate explanation [NGFS (2019b)]. A core aspect of the EU’s 
Sustainable Finance Action Plan is improved disclosure by corporations and 
financial institutions (see Box 2). 
Discussion has also focused on the effectiveness of differential capital 
adequacy ratios, which distinguish between low-carbon (or “green’) and high-
exposure (or “brown”) assets. The aim of such measures would be to reflect 
key risks not adequately reflected in market prices. One explanation for this 
shortcoming can be attributed to the short-term time horizon of most banks 
and investors, within which the full materialisation of climate risks may not fall 
[Carney (2019b)]. So far, the rationale for higher capital ratios for carbon-
intensive assets has found greater favour among the central bank community, 
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in other words a potential “brown penalising factor” rather than a “green 
supporting factor”. 
In addition, there is growing interest in the possible utilisation of pillar 2 mechanisms, 
such as capital buffers to deal with climate-related risks inadequately managed by 
financial institutions (such as stranding risk for coal-assets). 
Box 1
THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES (TCFD)
Under the chairmanship of Mark Carney, the FSB 
convened the TCFD in early 2016 to develop 
recommendations on climate-related financial disclosures. 
Enhancing disclosure was seen as the first and best step 
at the time to implement the G20’s directive of making 
sure financial markets account for climate change in their 
operations. Its work is being supported by Bloomberg and 
the Big Four accounting firms. Thus, while the TCFD was 
convened and endorsed by the FSB, it is a fully industry-
led institution with minimal involvement by central banks 
and financial supervisors. The TCFD published its final 
recommendations on climate-related financial disclosures 
in summer 2017.
Closely following the risk taxonomy developed by the 
BoE’s PRA, these recommendations provide companies 
with a framework for how to think about climate change 
within their organisation by separating this thinking into 
four distinct categories: Strategy, Governance, Risk 
Management, and Metrics & Targets. Following this 
categorisation, the recommendations lay out more 
specific guidance on disclosure for both financial and 
non-financial corporations. For the financial sector, 
guidance addresses the specificities of banks, insurance 
companies, asset managers, and asset owners. For non-
financial corporations, specific guidance was issued for 
the energy, transportation, materials & building as well as 
for the agriculture, food, and forests products sector. 
One of the most prominent features of the TCFD’s 
recommendations related to forward-looking disclosure 
aided by scenario analysis. 
This element of scenario analysis can also be counted as 
one of the main achievements of the TCFD: Firmly 
establishing the notion of forward-looking analysis and 
disclosure in the debate around how the financial 
industry can and should account for climate change is a 
major contribution the TCFD made. This allows 
stakeholders as well as supervisors to get an insight not 
into how a company is doing under present conditions of 
pervasive market and policy failure but how it is planning 
to develop in a future characterised by a stern transition 
towards a low-carbon economy or by catastrophic 
climate-related impacts on ecosystems, societies and 
economies. The TCFD’s second major achievement is 
the sourcing of industry consensus on how to think 
about climate change within a company. The flexible and 
yet comprehensive framework of the four categories of 
strategy, governance, risk management, and metrics & 
targets both standardise disclosure across and within 
markets while on a more fundamental scale instruct 
internal company practice around the issue of climate 
change. The TCFD recommendations firmly establish 
that climate change is financially material and therefore a 
matter of financial and not sustainability disclosure while 
at the same time providing a first suggestion of how 
exactly climate change is material and what therefore 
needs to be disclosed on this issue.
In some regards, however, the TCFD recommendations 
do not suffice as disclosure framework, particularly for 
central banks and financial supervisors. First, the 
recommendations exclusively focus on climate change, 
neglecting other crucial and material environmental 
issues. Thus, the TCFD framework is not suitable for a 
systemic view on financial markets as it does not fully 
capture a company’s dual embeddedness in the wider 
financial system which in turn is embedded in a socio-
ecological system. Second, the TCFD framework’s 
main focus lies on risks as opposed to opportunities. 
Third, as of September 2019, implementation is slow 
and disclosure practices are underdeveloped even 
according to the TCFD’s own Status Reports. The fact 
that the recommendations allow a grace period within 
which climate-related disclosure can be moved from 
the financial filings to separate climate or sustainability 
reports does not spur thorough reporting either. Thus, 
financial supervisors and regulators might learn from 
this experience and not resort to private self-regulation 
for the sake of speed as voluntary regulation might be 
faster in its development but slower and more limited in 
its implementation phase.
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2.3 Macroprudential policy
Environmental and climate change-related risks also have implications for the financial 
stability of the system as a whole and are therefore relevant for macroprudential policy 
frameworks [Campiglio et al. (2018)]. While standard macroprudential approaches do 
not explicitly take climate risks into account, approaches “green macroprudential 
policy” have started to be developed [Monnin (2018); and Schoenmaker and Van 
Tilburg (2016)]. Apart from mitigating transition risk and the financial stability 
implications of a manifestation of stranded assets, green macroprudential policy also 
has allocative effects and can play a role in incentivising a transition to low-carbon 
assets. Instruments that could be adjusted to take account of systemic climate and 
sustainability risks include calibrated countercyclical capital buffers, capital instruments 
(risk weights) and caps. Countercyclical capital buffers, which are implemented to 
ensure that capital requirements for the banking sector take threats to overall financial 
stability into account, can be implemented to require banks to increase their capital 
buffer in order to protect the sector from periods of excessive carbon-intensive credit 
growth. Instruments under the structural pillar, so-called “large exposure restrictions”, 
can be calibrated to address the exposure concentration to unsustainable investment 
and, if large banks are insufficiently incentivised to address climate-related risks, 
capital surcharges for SIFI could be adjusted accordingly. 
The incorporation of climate risks into macroprudential frameworks again centrally 
relies on the understanding and disclosure of risk and effective disclosure 
requirements can play a vital facilitating role. The understanding of the exposure of 
individual institutions and the financial system to climate change-related risks can 
be enhanced through the incorporation of these risks into stress testing, which 
creates a foundation for the calibration of macroprudential policy instruments, such 
as countercyclical capital buffers [NGFS (2019b)]. Methodologies for the evaluation 
of climate risks through stress tests have been pioneered by Battiston et al. (2017) 
and Vermeulen et al. (2019). De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) has been the first to 
conduct a climate risk-related stress test in 2018 for the Netherlands with the aim of 
quantifying the consequences of a disruptive energy transition for financial stability. 
A central finding has been that a disruptive transition could be associated with 
substantial losses for the financial sector [Elderson (2019b)]. Furthermore, the Bank 
of England has announced its intentions to apply stress testing of physical and 
transition risk to insurance companies [Bank of England (2019a)], which it also plans 
to extend to general financial institutions by 2021 [Bank of England (2019b)].
2.4 Monetary policy
Climate change can potentially directly affect price stability and therefore has 
implications for monetary policy, independently of whether policies to mitigate 
climate risks will be successfully implemented in the future. Climate change-related 
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shocks to the economy may either occur in the form of a demand shock, which is 
controllable for the central bank because growth and inflation move in the same 
direction, or as a supply shock, which is more difficult to address because inflation 
and output may move in different directions, thereby creating a potential trade-off 
for central banks between the stabilisation of inflation and output [Cœuré (2018), 
p. 2). Typically, climate change-related shocks are considered to manifest as supply 
shocks, caused for example by droughts, floods or heatwaves that can negatively 
affect agricultural production and create upward pressure on food prices [Parker 
(2018)]. In practice, different climate change mitigation scenarios also have diverse 
and specific implications for different monetary policy regimes [McKibbin et al. 
(2017)]. One factor worthy of further consideration is how monetary policy could 
need to adjust in light of the more capital-intensive nature of the low-carbon, 
climate resilient economy. The transition involves a higher rate of upfront investment 
– for example in energy efficiency or renewable energy technology – offset by lower 
energy and resource use in terms of operating costs. At the margin, this shift from 
an “Opex” to a “Capex” focused economy would be more sensitive to changes in 
the cost of capital (and thus interest rates). Historically low interest rates since the 
financial crisis have thus provided a strong positive tailwind behind the deployment 
of low-carbon solutions which could falter if rates normalise in the future.
Climate change has implications for both conventional and unconventional monetary 
policies. The introduction of quantitative easing (QE) following the financial crisis 
failed to take the environmental and the social quality of asset purchases into 
account. The result was an unintentional carbon bias in the corporate bond purchase 
programmes of the Bank of England and the European Central Bank which have 
been skewed towards carbon-intensive industries [Matikainen et al. (2017)]. This has 
prompted calls for the “greening” of QE along with central bank balance sheet and 
monetary policy operations. For example, the ECB’s practice of buying new bonds 
as its existing stock comes to maturity, as well as its plans of renewed bond 
purchases, announced in September 2019, is seen to offer a “window of opportunities” 
for the central bank to replace the old bonds of its quantitative easing programme 
with new environmental green bonds [De Grauwe (2019)]. This experience also raises 
a fundamental question for central bankers on how to interpret the principle of 
market neutrality: should policy be neutral relative to the current market, which is 
subject to pervasive market failures, or relative to a sustainable market in which 
externalities are priced? 
2.5 Scaling up green finance
Climate change is now recognised as not just generating risks to the stability of the 
financial system, but also requiring a substantial reallocation in financial flows to 
scale up investments in sustainable solutions [Elderson (2019a)]. According to HSBC, 
the world needs to invest $6-8 trillion per year by 2030 to keep the global temperature 
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rise below two degrees Celsius, while current levels only amount to $1 trillion per 
year at the very best [Klier (2019)]. 
Central banks can engage in the scaling up of green finance for two main reasons. 
First, the mandates of some central banks oblige them to support government 
priorities and/or sustainable development [Dikau and Volz (2019a)]. Second, due to 
the endogenous nature of climate risk, the scaling up of green finance can be seen 
as a long-term risk management strategy to alleviate the most severe physical 
climate shocks. At the same time, scaling up green finance mitigates systemic 
transition risk by creating capital market infrastructure capable of absorbing and 
allocating the capital freed by potential divestment from assets which are not aligned 
with climate change targets. To mobilise and scale up green finance, central banks 
have various policy instruments at their disposal. There are significant differences of 
mandates and broader policy frameworks among central banks and supervisors, as 
well as across advanced and emerging market and developing economies with 
regard to how they approach the issue of scaling up green finance. Central bank in 
advanced economies have started to green their own portfolios. Some central banks 
in emerging markets and developing economies have taken more active – and 
contentious – allocative approaches.
2.5.1 The greening of central bank portfolios
Increasingly the integration of environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria in 
the portfolio management of central banks is recognised as an important step 
through which monetary institutions can “lead by example” while staying within their 
mandate [Cœuré (2018) and NGFS (2018)]. This brings central banks into line with the 
wider move towards responsible investment by leading asset owners: more than 
2,000 institutions with an excess of $80 trillion in assets have now signed the 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI). 
On the asset side of central bank balance sheets, there are four portfolios, which 
have been discussed with regard to their suitability for the incorporation of ESG 
criteria in order to promote green finance [Cœuré (2018)]. Traditionally, central banks 
manage three types of portfolios, including foreign assets (such as exchange 
reserves), pension funds and a portfolio of own funds, which provides the central 
bank with income to help cover its operating expenses. Additionally, the implementation 
of “unconventional” monetary policy measures has added a fourth asset portfolio to 
the balance sheets of some institutions, which, as discussed above, need to have 
sustainability factors incorporated to avoid an unintended carbon bias. 
With regard to foreign assets, problems can potentially arise from the need to balance 
ESG objectives against liquidity, safety and return [Fender et al. (2019)]. Initial research 
has shown that the safety and return of green bonds support their incorporation into 
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reserve portfolios, however, their accessibility and lack of liquidity in markets currently 
pose some constraints (ibid.). Central banks” pension portfolios have been recognised 
as suitable for the incorporation of ESG standards, which constitutes a rather 
uncontroversial first step that has been taken already by several institutions, including 
the ECB [Cœuré (2018)]. 
The incorporation of ESG principles into central banks” own activities can achieve 
several objectives. First, it ensures that risks are appropriately accounted for in 
central banks” portfolios; second, it guarantees that central banks” operations are 
not subject to an unintended carbon bias; and third, it can also contribute to the 
scaling up of green finance. Again, this practice is still far from universally accepted, 
however it has been increasingly addressed by leading central bankers [Cœuré 
(2018) and Elderson (2019a)]. In practice, the DNB has been the first central bank to 
include ESG criteria in its investment processes, having applied ESG considerations 
to its own funds and foreign reserves portfolios [De Nederlandsche Bank (2019)]. 
DNB was also the first central bank to sign the PRI.
2.5.2 The development of green financial markets
Effective markets for green assets are of central importance under a “bottom-up” 
approach, which relies primarily on markets to play a central role in financing the 
economic transition to a low-carbon economy. An important facilitating role for central 
banks and supervisors lies in addressing the problem of missing markets and 
supporting the creation of new asset classes in listed equities and debt as well as 
unlisted assets such as infrastructure that are aligned with long-term system health. 
Green bonds have been a particular focus and demonstrated strong growth through 
a combination of initial market-making by public development banks, demand from 
institutional investors, the development of voluntary guidelines and standards as 
well as measures from security regulators to ensure market integrity. One issue that 
has been highlighted is that the trade of green bonds is obstructed by a lack of 
transparency and standardization with regard to the reporting climate risks and 
missing markets, leading to low liquidity and turnover in these markets [Krogstrup 
and Oman (2019), p. 27)]. Deep, liquid and more advanced markets for green assets 
can, in turn, play a central role in increasing demand for and the supply of green 
securities, thereby contributing to reducing the cost of financing climate change 
mitigation efforts (ibid.). The importance of certification in the green bond market 
through independent third parties has been stressed as a central element that can 
enable firms to improve their environmental footprint [Flammer (2019)]. The 
development of market infrastructure, information and issuance guidelines can be 
centrally supported through green bond guidelines and taxonomies. Green bond 
guidelines and definitions of criteria define what the use of the proceeds from green 
bond issuances can be, and also regulate disclosure standards. Both measures can 
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strengthen the issuance of green bonds by preventing greenwashing and lowering 
transaction costs. With regard to disclosure, the introduction of disclosure 
requirements regarding environmental and sustainability-related information on 
bonds and other assets can contribute to the strengthening of the identification and 
acceptance of green assets. In practice, examples of support for the development 
of green bond markets include the EU’s outline for a green bond standard as part of 
its Sustainable Finance Action Plan (see Box 2), as well as various efforts of the 
Peoples Bank of China’s (PBOC). 
This points to the wider efforts in China by the central bank and financial authorities 
to green its financial system, stretching back to the 1980s [Zadek and Chenghui 
(2014)]. In 2007, the PBOC, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(formerly CBRC) and the Ministry of Environmental Protection jointly issued the 
Green Credit Policy in 2007. Efforts to develop definitions of green credit also trace 
back to 2007 to the jointly-issued Opinions on Implementing Environmental 
Protection Policies and Regulations to Prevent Credit Risks [NGFS (2019b)]. In 2016, 
alongside its inclusion of green finance into its presidency of the G20, China also 
issued comprehensive Guidance on Greening the Financial System in 2016. 
2.5.3 Green credit allocation
The scaling up of green finance and “greening” of the economy may also be 
facilitated through more direct government guidance, following a “top-down” 
approach. The underlying justifying rationale can be seen in the existence of 
pervasive market failures, which may prevent markets from bringing about a low-
carbon transition on their own. For example, due to a discrepancy between private 
returns and social or environmental returns, banks and other financial institutions 
may not allocate their resources to sustainable and green activities on their own, 
funding carbon-intensive and polluting industries instead. In this situation, as 
discussed by Stiglitz (1994), a market failure-alleviating and Pareto efficiency-
improving role for central bank and financial supervisors can emerge. Because 
market failures may also lead to a lack of necessary long-term private investment, 
financial policies are widely seen as a necessary complement to fiscal policies 
[Krogstrup and Oman (2019)]. 
Monetary and supervisory institutions have a wide variety of allocative instruments at 
their disposal, in order to directly intervene into the allocation of credit and enhance 
the flow of resources to sustainable projects. Instruments include targeted refinancing 
lines, portfolio ceilings, differential interest rate ceilings, informal credit guidance and 
other quasi-fiscal tools, which can be implemented to intervene in the allocation of 
credit and direct resources to green sectors and industries [Dikau and Volz (2019b)]. 
The effectiveness and appropriateness of most of these instruments depends 
centrally on the structure and sophistication of the financial system and interventionist 
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Box 2
EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH TO SUSTAINABLE FINANCE
The EU Commission appointed at the end of 2016 a High-
Level Expert Group (HLEG) on sustainable finance, which 
played a central role in mainstreaming sustainable finance 
as a normal policy goal for EU policymakers [Thimann 
(2019)]. The groups final report caused the European 
Commission to develop its own Action Plan [European 
Commission (2018)]. Building on the core recommendations 
and proposals of the HLEG, the Commission report 
focuses on two central aspects of sustainable finance, 
namely, first, the contribution of finance to sustainable 
growth and secondly, the incorporation of ESG factors into 
investment decision-making. The 10 actions proposed 
under the Action Plan include “necessary” (prudential 
rules, financial product standards, low-carbon benchmarks 
and “green” product labels), as well as “complementary” 
(public investment and policy, and private investment, 
corporate disclosure and provision of investment advice) 
elements.
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policies, which have historically been discussed as a form of “financial repression”, 
remain controversial and have been associated with distortive side-effects. Most of 
these instruments are no longer used in advanced economies today, where they fell 
out of favour in the 1970s. An active sustainability-enhancing role also raises questions 
with regard to the compatibility with current mandated objectives of central banks 
and financial supervisors. Generally, an interventionist allocative role of central banks 
and supervisors stands in contrast to the understanding of the neutrality of central 
banking policy towards different segments of the economy as well as to the concept 
of central bank independence. This raises the question of in how far an active 
contribution to the scaling up of green finance and the support for a transition to a 
low-carbon economy is compatible with current mandates. Independent of the scope 
of individual mandates, however, actively informing governments and the general 
public on the current failures and shortcomings of financial markets to account for 
climate change in order to facilitate the necessary interventions by the responsible 
institutions – whether by governments or parliaments – clearly lies within the mandate 
of every central bank.
In practice, some emerging market and developing economies have continuously 
utilised credit guidance policies to allocate credit to priority sectors, including green 
industries [Dikau and Ryan-Collins (2017)]. Examples include the central bank of 
Bangladesh, which has introduced several green credit allocation programmes, 
such as preferential refinancing for “green” loans, with the aim of enhancing 
commercial bank lending for sustainable investment [Barkawi and Monnin (2015)]. 
The overall approach of Chinese authorities, among them the PBOC, has been 
described as a “top-down” model, in which macroprudential and monetary policy 
play key roles and which differs from the Western “bottom-up” approach that 
attributes a central role to the private sector [Yao (2018)]. Among various initiatives, 
the PBOC has incorporated green finance into its macroprudential framework in 
order to incentivise the scaling up of green finance (ibid.). The Reserve Bank of India 
continues to maintain a Priority Sector Lending (PSL) programme introduced in the 
1940s, under which commercial banks are required to allocate a percentage of their 
loan portfolio according to the central bank’s economic priorities. Recently, the 
programme’s targets were extended to also include renewable energy [Reserve 
Bank of India (2016)].
3 Challenges and new horizons
This growing body of action by financial authorities, alongside action by market 
participants and complemented by an increasingly incisive academic literature, 
is an impressive achievement in the space of only a few years. Yet these steps 
remain at an early stage, with limited breadth and depth. In the words of Bank 
of England Governor Mark Carney in October 2019: “Like virtually everything 
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else in the response to climate change, the development of a more sustainable 
financial system is not moving fast enough for the world to reach net zero” 
[Carney (2019c), p. 3].
The current phase of adjusting existing central bank and supervisory policies is only a 
few years old and it is still too early to evaluate the impact of these measures in terms 
of the classic three-fold policy priorities of their effectiveness, efficiency and equity 
(fairness). In addition, as these initiatives straddle the worlds of financial and 
sustainability policy, new tools will be needed to assess the achievement of two or 
more objectives. From a finance perspective, the focus will need to be on how these 
initiatives improve market efficiency and system resilience. From a sustainability 
perspective, the question is whether these measures lead to the enhanced delivery of 
social and environmental outcomes [McDaniels and Robins (2018)]. Furthermore, 
attention needs to be placed on identifying positive (and negative) unintended 
consequences of this greening process. 
Many challenges lie ahead and to conclude this chapter, we would like to outline four 
of these, highlighting the role that academic research could play. 
3.1 Clarifying core definitions, disclosures and differentials
As policy makers, supervisors and market participants have sought to build a 
sustainable financial system, a set of fundamental issues have come to the 
foreground. These include how to introduce a common language for green and 
sustainable finance that enables reliable classification and thus efficient market 
responses. This need lies behind the introduction of the EU’s sustainable finance 
taxonomy (see Box 2), which builds on market practice (for example, in the green 
bond market). The strategic prize is the system-wide adoption of definitions that can 
be applied to national statistics and measurements, decisions by issuers, banks, 
investors and insurers, as well as the way in which financial supervisors oversee the 
system as a whole. Indeed, financial authorities need a clear way of identifying which 
assets and activities are “system enhancing” from a sustainability perspective and 
which are “system degrading”. Agreeing such a taxonomy is by no means an easy 
process – even in terms of identifying activities that can be classified as “green” –, 
let alone “brown”. But practical steps can be taken now within the EU and globally 
on priority areas. Ensuring that the definitions are dynamic is also recognised as a 
critical characteristic to enable this taxonomy building to be a learning process. 
Finally, a taxonomy of activities defined in terms of the transition to the low-carbon 
economy still needs to be supplemented by environmental, social and governance 
analysis by banks, investors and insurers as well as financial authorities. 
Alongside this imperative lies the related priority of ensuring consistent, reliable and 
market-wide disclosure of key data points. The FSB’s TCFD recommendations have 
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made a significant step forward, but their recommendations only relate to climate 
change. Further convergence is needed on common standards across the ESG and 
sustainability area, for example, through initiatives such as the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI). From a financial system perspective, consistent data and disclosure 
is also needed for sovereign bonds, one of the largest asset classes, but one that is 
omitted from existing reporting frameworks, such as the TCFD.
Importantly, the absence of comprehensive disclosures should not postpone efforts 
to assess and take action on sustainability factors until a world of “perfect 
information” is achieved. Serious attention therefore needs to be placed on how to 
take decisions under uncertainty in the context of incomplete data. This is 
particularly important for the critical question of evaluating the implications of 
sustainability factors for the risk and performance differentials of financial assets 
and institutions. Even in the context of profound market and policy failures, 
increasing evidence is available for assets on public equity and debt markets which 
suggests that assets with superior ESG performance offer better risk-adjusted 
returns [Benlemlih and Bitar (2018), Friede et al. (2015) and In et al. (2017)]. However, 
far less evidence is available for the performance of loans on bank balance sheets, 
not least because the underlying data is confidential and not disclosed. For the 
NGFS, the assessment of whether a financial risk differential exists between “green” 
and “brown” assets has also been listed as a key challenge [NGFS (2018)]. Here, 
there is considerable potential for joint research between central banks that have 
access to this data and academic institutions. 
3.2  Reflecting on strategic principles to guide the greening 
of the financial system
Even in a world of shared definitions and perfect information, central banks 
would still face profound challenges over the strategic principles they should 
apply to the sustainability imperative. Climate change and associated 
environmental challenges do not easily fit within the framework of conventional 
regulatory wisdom for two interrelated reasons. First, time horizons are far 
longer and, second, impacts can be irreversible and real uncertainty is intrinsic, 
partially due to the longer time scales involved. The “tragedy of the horizon” 
that Governor Carney identified in 2015 still remains, although greater visibility 
over potential future shocks is emerging through the first wave of scenario 
analyses and stress tests. Looking ahead, specific attention needs to be 
focused on what long-term supervision and monetary policy could look like 
and how this could address continuing market imperatives for short-termism 
[Thomä and Chenet (2017)].
Further reflection also needs to take place on how core principles of central 
banking practice might need to change in the new era of the climate emergency. 
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The principle of market neutrality is one of these as discussed above in section 
2.4. As Ignazio Visco, Governor of Banca d’Italia has noted “it may be inquired 
whether this principle [of market neutrality] should be fully preserved or be 
adjusted in a context in which, absent of further regulation, market forces are 
pushing greenhouse gas concentrations to levels that will soon be unsustainable” 
[Visco (2019), p. 5]. In addition, to account for intrinsic uncertainty and the 
fundamental threat of irreversible damage to vital ecosystem functions, new 
principles could be usefully adopted by central banks and financial authorities, 
such as most notably the precautionary principle, long a core feature of 
environmental policy. This states that the absence of information and inherent 
uncertainty that is intrinsic to a climate transition should not stop preventive 
action [Ryan-Collins (2019)]. 
3.3  Broadening the scope from climate change to sustainable 
development 
To date, much of the focus of central bank initiatives has been focused on climate 
change. However, this is not the only environmental threat facing the financial 
system. In developing countries, environmental problems such as air pollution 
and water stress are more pressing, with climate change playing the role of a 
threat multiplier rather than a primary focus. In China, for example, the first 
environmental stress test was focused on air pollution rather than climate change. 
This points to the need to consider an integrated approach that looks at the 
intersecting issues of the ecological transition as a whole rather than just 
individual features such as climate change alone. Some central banks, such as 
DNB, have started to explore the strategic implications for their work of the full 
set of environmental challenges in the Sustainable Development Goals [De 
Nederlandsche Bank (2019)].
Beyond this, central banks will need to consider how they respond both to the 
social implications involved in greening the financial system, as well as the core social 
objectives of the SDGs such as ending poverty, reducing inequality and ensuring 
universal access to essential financial services. 
One example of this is the imperative of ensuring a “just transition” to a zero-carbon 
economy, a commitment included in the Paris Agreement. Policymakers, key 
stakeholders (such as trade unions), as well as long-term investors increasingly 
recognise that the transition will need to be “fair and seen to be fair”, making sure 
that workers, consumers and communities are not stranded or left behind in the 
process [CCC (2019)] and Robins et al. (2019)]. This joining up of the environmental 
and social dimensions of sustainability takes central banks and financial authorities 
back to their core system focus, where a close understanding of living standards, 
employment and regional prosperity is normal practice.
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3.4 Building supportive international regimes for central bank action
Central bank and financial supervisory approaches to sustainability have grown up 
through a complex interplay of national action and international coordination. 
Leadership at the national level is needed to initiate the process of change and 
inspire efforts in other jurisdictions. But international coordination is also essential, 
both to ensure the rapid take-up of good practice so that individual authorities do 
not need to “reinvent the wheel” and also to prevent regulatory arbitrage between 
different approaches to sustainable finance. Here, the EU’s Sustainable Financial 
Action Plan is the more comprehensive approach to international coordination and 
regulation.
To date, developing a habit of cooperation between authorities has been crucial to 
building momentum, with a focus, sharing experience and developing common 
approaches. Key initiatives have been the sector-focused coalitions such as 
Sustainable Insurance Forum and the Sustainable Banking Network as well as the 
more systemic NGFS (see Box 3) [IFC (2018), McDaniels et al. (2017) and NGFS 
(2019b)]. The FSB’s TCFD is an interesting example of a regulatory authority initiating 
a market-led, voluntary process of norm setting; the FSB itself has yet to incorporate 
climate risks into its routine operations. 
Clearly, one of the challenges for the future is when and how sustainability 
factors become incorporated into the core international regulatory regimes 
(such as the Basel framework for banking). This is both a technical question 
depending on the establishment of sufficient analytical foundations for 
action, as well as a political question relying on clear consensus from all G20 
nations. 
Responding to these and other challenges needs to be focus of the next phase of 
central bank action on sustainability. As part of this, there is a powerful agenda for 
academic teaching, research and policy dialogue. The Global Research Alliance 
for Sustainable Finance and Investment (GRASFI) is one network of academics 
working in this area. Another is the International Network for Sustainable Financial 
Policy Insights, Research, and Exchange (INSPIRE), established in 2019 [INSPIRE 
(2019)]. INSPIRE has been purpose-built to commission analysis and insights from 
best-in-class scholars and analysts in all parts of the world on key research 
questions linked to the NGFS work program. INSPIRE is hosted by the ClimateWorks 
Foundation and the Grantham Research Institute at the London School of 
Economics, and commissions research guided by an Advisory Committee along 
with inputs and exchange from the NGFS. 
A sustainable financial system is not only necessary but entirely possible. Making 
this a reality is increasingly a shared global objective.
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Box 3
NGFS RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE PRIORITIES
The NGFS has published a first comprehensive 
report, accompanied by six practical best practice 
recommendations for central banks, supervisors, 
and financial institutions on how to enhance their 
role in the greening of the financial system and 
incorporating environment and climate-related risks 
into their operations [NGFS (2019b)]. The first four 
recommendations are aimed at central banks and 
supervisors, while recommendations 5 and 6 
address broader issues.
1 The NGFS recommends the integrations of climate-
related risks into financial stability monitoring and 
microprudential supervision through i) the assessment 
of climate risks, and ii) the integration of these risks 
into prudential supervision.
2 The integration of sustainability factors into the 
management of central banks portfolios is 
acknowledged as an important and potentially 
pathbreaking step. 
3 Data gaps are recognised as a central challenge and 
the public sharing of data is considered to be an 
important enabling move.
4 The creation of in-house capacity and collaboration 
with other institutions is seen as a vital step that can 
contribute to rising awareness and establishing 
intellectual capacity.
5 Supporting the effort of establishing an 
internationally consistent climate and environmental 
disclosure framework as well as the work of the 
TCFD.
6 Encouraging the development of a taxonomy that 
enhances the transparency around which economic 
activities are “green” and which ones are most 
exposed to climate and environment-related risks. 
In April 2019 the NGFS also outlined its next steps with 
regard to concrete deliverables (ibid.):
1 Publishing a handbook on climate and environmental 
risk management for supervisory authorities and 
financial institutions that outlines concrete steps to 
better understand and respond to climate and 
environmental risks.
2 Issuing voluntary guidelines on scenario-based risk 
analysis and the development of data-driven scenarios 
to assess climate-related risks.
3 Providing best practices guidance for incorporating 
sustainability criteria into central banks” portfolio 
management.
Through the publications of its technical supplement 
to the first comprehensive report, the NGFS provides 
an overview of the academic research that focuses 
on modelling the impact of climate change on the 
economy and the financial system, and thereby 
provides a range of options for central banks and 
supervisors to assess climate change risks [NGFS 
(2019c)].
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 102 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 37
REFERENCES
Banco Central do Brasil (2011). Circular 3,547 of July 7, 2011 Establishes procedures and parameters related to the Internal Capital 
Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP).
Bank of England (2019a). Insurance Stress Test 2019, London.
— (2019b). New economy, new finance, new Bank: The Bank of England’s response to the van Steenis review on the Future of 
Finance, Bank of England Report, London.
Barkawi, A., and P. Monnin (2015). Monetary policy and sustainability: the case of Bangladesh, Inquiry Working Paper, No. 15/02, 
CEP and UNEP Inquiry.
Battiston, S., A. Mandel, I. Monasterolo, F. Schütze, and G. Visentin (2017). “A climate stress-test of the financial system”, Nature 
Climate Change, 7, pp. 283-288, https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3255.
Benlemlih, M., and M. Bitar (2018). “Corporate Social Responsibility and Investment Efficiency”, Journal of Business Ethics, 148(3), 
pp. 647-671, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3020-2.
Bredenkamp, H., and C. A. Pattillo (2010). Financing the Response to Climate Change, IMF Staff Position Note, No. SPN 10/06, 
Washington, DC.
Campiglio, E., Y. Dafermos, P. Monnin, J. Ryan-Collins, G. Schotten, and M. Tanaka (2018). “Climate change challenges for central 
banks and financial regulators”, Nature Climate Change, 8, pp. 462-468, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0175-0.
Carney, M. (2015). “Breaking the tragedy of the horizon – climate change and financial stability”, presented at the Lloyd’s, London.
— (2016). “Remarks on the Launch of the Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures”, presented 
at the Launch of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures consultative report, London, Tate Modern.
— (2019a). “Remarks given during the UN Secretary General’s Climate Action Summit 2019”, presented at the Climate Action 
Summit, New York, UN General Assembly.
— (2019b). “A New Horizon”, presented at the European Commission Conference: A global approach to sustainable finance, 
Brussels.
— (2019c). “TCFD: strengthening the foundations of sustainable finance”, presented at the TCFD Summit 2019, Tokyo.
CCC (2019). Net Zero – The UK’s contribution to stopping global warming, London.
Chan, N. (2018). “Welcome remarks”, presented at the 2018 Green and Social Bond Principles Annual Conference, Hong Kong.
Coady, D., I. Parry, N.-P. Le, and B. Shang (2019). Global Fossil Fuel Subsidies Remain Large: An Update Based on Country-Level 
Estimates, IMF Working Paper, No. 19/89, Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund.
Cœuré, B. (2018). “Monetary policy and climate change”, presented at the Conference on “Scaling up Green Finance: The Role of 
Central Banks”, Berlin, Bundesbank.
De Grauwe, P. (2019). Green money without inflation, Social Europe.
De Nederlandsche Bank (2019). Responsible Investment Charter, Amsterdam.
Delgado, M. (2019). “Sustainable Finance as the driving force of the ecological transition”, presented at the Roundtable “Sustainable 
Finance as the driving force of the ecological transition”, Madrid, Banco de España.
Dikau, S., and J. Ryan-Collins (2017). Green central banking in emerging market and developing country economies, http://
neweconomics.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Green-Central-Banking.pdf (accessed 3.24.18).
Dikau, S., and U. Volz (2019a). Central bank mandates, sustainability objectives and the promotion of green finance, SOAS 
Economics Working Paper, No. 222, London, SOAS University of London.
— (2019b). “Central banking, climate change, and green finance”, in J. Sachs, W. T. Woo, N. Yoshino, and F. Taghizadeh-Hesary 
(Eds.), Handbook of Green Finance, Singapore, Springer, pp. 81-102.
Ehlers, T., K. de Greiff, and F. Packer (2018). “Pricing of environmental risk in syndicated loans”, presented at the NGFS-Bundesbank 
Conference, Berlin.
Ehlers, T., and F. Packer (2017). “Green bond finance and certification”, BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements.
Elderson, F. (2019a). “We all play a vital role”, presented at the International Capital Markets Conference, Frankfurt.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 103 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 37
Elderson, F. (2019b). “We need to ensure resilience to climate-change risk”.
European Commission (2018). Communication from the Commission Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth [No. COM (2018) 
97 final], Brussels.
Farid, M., M. Keen, M. G. Papaioannou, I. W. H. Parry, C. A. Pattillo, and A. Ter-Martirosyan (2016). After Paris: Fiscal, Macroeconomic, 
and Financial Implications of Climate Change, IMF Staff Discussion Note, No. 16/01, Washington, DC, International Monetary 
Fund.
Fender, I., M. McMorrow, V. Sahakyan, and O. Zulaica (2019). “Green bonds: the reserve managment perspective”, BIS Quarterly 
Review, Bank for International Settlements.
Flammer, C. (2019). Green Bonds: Effectiveness and Implications for Public Policy, Working Paper, No. 25950, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, https://doi.org/10.3386/w25950.
Friede, G., T. Busch, and A. Bassen (2015). “ESG and financial performance: aggregated evidence from more than 2,000 empirical 
studies”, Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment, 5, pp. 210-233, https://doi.org/10.1080/20430795.2015.1118917.
Gandhi, S. R. (2016). “Green finance – early initiatives”, presented at the Launch of the Final UNEP India Inquiry Report titled 
“Delivering a Sustainable Financial System in India”, Mumbai.
IAIS, SIF (2018). Press Release – New paper calls on insurance sector to intensify climate risk scrutiny, Moscow.
IFC (2018). Sustainable Banking Network (SBN) Global progress report, Washington, DC.
In, S. Y., K. Y. Park, and A. H. B. Monk (2017). Is “Being Green” Rewarded in the Market?: An Empirical Investigation of Decarbonization 
and Stock Returns, Stanford Global Project Center Working Paper, Stanford, Stanford University.
INSPIRE (2019). Second call for research proposals on central banks, supervision, and greening the financial system, July, San 
Francisco, California, ClimateWorks Foundation.
IOPS (2019). Supervisory guidelines on the integration of ESG factors in the investment and risk management of pension funds, 
Paris.
IOSCO (2019). Statement on disclosure of ESG matters by issuers, IOSCO Statement, Madrid.
Jones, D. (2018). Insurance and climate risk: the critical role of regulators, Sustainable Finance Leadership Series, London, London 
School of Economics.
Klier, D. (2019). “Green finance is still stuck in the slow lane after New York Climate Week”, City A.M.
Knot, K. (2015). “The role of central banks; the Netherlands Bank and sustainable finance”, presented at the Sustainable Finance 
Seminar, organized by the United Nations Environmental Program and the Sustainable Finance Lab, and hosted by the 
Netherlands Bank, Amsterdam, De Nederlandsche Bank.
— 2018. “From mission to supervision”, presented at the Bundesbank Symposium “Banking Supervision in dialogue”, Frankfurt am 
Main.
Krogstrup, S., and W. Oman (2019). Macroeconomic and financial policies for climate change mitigation: a review of the literature, 
IMF Working Paper, No. 19/185, Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund. 
Lagarde, C., and V. Gaspar (2019). Getting Real on Meeting Paris Climate Change Commitments, IMF Blog.
Lian, J. C. C. (2017). “Advancing environmental goals through sustainable finance initiatives in Malaysia”, presented at the Launch 
of “Nature Nurtured/Pameran Lestari Alam” Exhibition, Kuala Lumpur.
Matikainen, S., E. Campiglio, and D. Zenghelis (2017). The climate impact of quantitative easing, Grantham Research Institute on 
Climate Change and the Environment, London, London School of Economics and Political Science.
McDaniels, J., and N. Robins (2018). Greening the rules of the game, Inquiry Working Paper, No. 18/01, Geneva, United Nations 
Environment Programme.
McDaniels, J., N. Robins, and B. Bacani (2017). Sustainable insurances, UN Environment Inquiry into the Design of a Sustainable 
Financial System.
McKibbin, W. J., A. C. Morris, A. Panton, and P. Wilcoxen (2017). Climate change and monetary policy: dealing with disruption, 
SSRN Scholarly Paper, No. 3084399, Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY.
Monnin, P. (2018). Central banks should reflect climate risks in monetary policy operations, SUERF Policy Note, No. 41.
NGFS (2018). First Progress Report, Paris, Banque de France.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 104 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 37
NGFS (2019a). Press release: NGFS welcomes four new members and the IMF as an observer, Paris, Banque de France.
— (2019b). First comprehensive report – A call for action, Paris, Banque de France.
— (2019c). Technical supplement to the first comprehensive report – Macroeconomic and financial stability, Paris, Banque de 
France.
Parker, M. (2018). “The impact of disasters on inflation”, Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, 2, pp. 21-48.
Pereira da Silva, L. A. (2019). “Research on climate-related risks and financial stability: an ‘epistemological break’?”, presented at 
the Conference of the Central Banks and Supervisors for the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), Paris.
Powell, J. H. (2019). Letter to the Honorable Brian Schatz.
PRI (2019). Taking stock: Sustainable finance policy engagement and policy influence, UNEP Finance Initiative, London, UN Global 
Compact.
Reserve Bank of India (2016). Annual Report 2015-16, Mumbai.
Robins, N., V. Brunsting, and D. Wood (2019). Climate Change and the Just Transition: A guide for investor action, Grantham 
Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London, London School of Economics.
Robins, N., and S. Zadek (2016). The financial system we need – From momentum to transformation, UNEP Inquiry into the Design 
of a Sustainable Financial System.
Rudebusch, G. D. (2019). Climate change and the Federal Reserve, FRBSF Economics Letter, San Francisco, California, Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Ryan-Collins, J. (2019). Beyond voluntary disclosure: why a “market-shaping” approach to financial regulation is needed to meet the 
challenge of climate change, SUERF Policy Note, No. 61, SUERF – The European Money and Finance Forum.
Schoenmaker, D., and R. van Tilburg (2016). “What role for financial supervisors in addressing environmental risks?”, Comparative 
Economic Studies, 58, pp. 317-334, https://doi.org/10.1057/ces.2016.11.
Stern, N. (2007). The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1994). The role of the state in financial markets, Report No. 14334, Washington, DC, The World Bank.
Thimann, C. (2019). How the EU learned to love sustainable finance: the inside story of the HLEG, Sustainable Finance Leadership 
Series, London, London School of Economics.
Thomä, J., and H. Chenet (2017). “Transition risks and market failure: a theoretical discourse on why financial models and economic 
agents may misprice risk related to the transition to a low-carbon economy”, Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment, 7, 
pp. 82-98, https://doi.org/10.1080/20430795.2016.1204847.
UNFCCC (2016). Paris Agreement, New York.
Vermeulen, R., E. Schets, M. Lohuis, B. Kölbl, D.-J. Jansen, and W. Heeringa (2019). The Heat is on: A Framework for Measuring 
Financial Stress under Disruptive Energy Transition Scenarios, DNB Working Paper, No. 625, Amsterdam, De Nederlandsche 
Bank.
Villeroy de Galhau, F. (2018). “Green Finance – a new frontier for the 21st century”, presented at the International Climate Risk 
Conference for Supervisors, Amsterdam.
— (2015). “Climate change – the financial sector and pathways to 2°C”, presented at the COP 21, Paris.
Visco, I. (2019). “Sustainable development and climate risks: the role of central banks”, presented at the 18th International Conference 
for Credit Risk Evaluation “Assessing and Managing Climate Change Risk: Opportunities for Financial Institutions”, Venice.
Weidmann, J. (2017). “Green bond issuance and other forms of low-carbon finance – welcome and opening speech”, presented at 
the OMFIF Global Public Investor Symposium on “Green bond issuance and other forms of low-carbon finance”, Frankfurt am 
Main.
Wuermeling, J. (2017). “Remarks on the growing importance of Green Finance”, presented at the dinner reception within the scope 
of the Green Finance Study Group meeting, Frankfurt am Main.
Yao, W. (2018). China’s green finance strategy: much achieved, further to go, Sustainable Finance Leadership Series, London, 
London School of Economics.
Zadek, S., and Z. Chenghui (2014). Greening China’s Financial System – An Initial Exploration, Winnipeg, Beijing, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) and the Development Research Center of the State Council.
